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No. 14161 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, as the administratrix of the Estate of 
Thressa G. Jones, deceased, seeks a determination by this Court 
that the revocable inter vivos trust created by Clarence T. 
Jones on the eve of the marriage between the grantor and 
Thressa G. Jones constituted a fraud on the marital rights of 
Thressa G. Jones as the surviving spouse of the grantor or, in 
the alternative, that the retention of all incidents of owner-
ship by the grantor constituted possession during the marriage 
of a legal or equitable estate in the real property that con-
stituted a portion of the trust corpus so as to vest in the 
surviving widow a one-third distributive fee simple interest 
in said real property pursuant to Section 74-4-3, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE 
The Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Robert Bullock presiding, 
by Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, and Judgment, under 
date of May 22, 1975 (R. 141-152), held, 
"That the estate of Thressa G. Jones, deceased, 
has no interest in or to the real property con-
veyed by Clarence T. Jones, deceased, to the 
defendant, First Security Bank N.A., and held 
in trust by said defendant * * * ." (R. 152) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment of the 
lower Court and a determination by this Court that Thressa G. 
Jones, on the death of her husband, Clarence T. Jones, became 
vested with a one-third in value fee simple interest in the 
real property held by the trustee during the marriage between 
the parties pursuant to the terms of the revocable inter vivos 
trust. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In March or April of 1961, Dr. Clarence T. Jones became 
acquainted with Mr. Thomas C. Cuthbert, a trust officer for the 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., relative to the establishment 
of a trust (T. 94). Pursuant to preliminary conversations, 
Mr. Cuthbert corresponded to Dr. Jones by letter under date of 
May 31, 1961 (Ex. 3) outlining various possibilities available 
to Dr. Jones. Mr. Cuthbert recommended a revocable lifetime 
trust that would: (1) Retain the possession, right of use, 
2. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and enjoyment of all non-income producing assets and tangi-
ble personal property in Dr. Jones during his lifetime; (2) 
pay the income of the trust to Dr. Jones as directed by the 
grantor; (3) reside in the grantor the right to obtain any 
of the principal of the trust at any time; and (4) restrict 
the sale, acquisition or investment of any trust asset 
without the prior authorization and consent of Dr. Jones 
(Ex. 3, p. 3). In summarizing this available alternative, 
Mr. Cuthbert observed: 
"From the foregoing, you can see that, except 
for the transfer of bear legal title to the 
assets, your control of your affairs would not 
be substantially different from that which you 
now have." (Ex. 3, p. 3) (Emphasis added.) 
Mr. Cuthbert also noted: 
nYou are also mindful of the possibility that 
you may remarry sometime in the future and de-
sire to insure that your child and grandchildren 
be cared for in a manner which would insure that 
a future wife could not disrupt the program." 
(Ex. 3, p. 2) 
The preliminary discussions and recommendations culmi-
nated in the execution between the parties of a Trust Agreement 
under date of June 23, 1961, (R. 26-41), that required the trustee 
to pay to Dr. Jones such amounts from the income or principal as 
Dr. Jones should from time-to-time direct in writing and further 
provided: 
"IV. RIGHTS RESERVED BY GRANTOR. 
A. The grantor expressly reserves the right 
at any time, and from time-to-time, to amend 
this agreement in any of its provisions, or to 
revoke the same in whole or in part, and to free 
3. 
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any or all of the Trust Estate from the terms of 
this trust, and to withdraw all or any part of 
the principal of the Trust Estate by written 
notice to the Trustee of his election so to do, 
and demand upon the Trustee to reassign, convey, 
transfer or deliver [sic] to the Grantor the 
property so specified. 
•k i< it 
C. During the lifetime of the Grantor, the 
Trustee shall make no sale or other disposition 
of any property of the Trust Estate, and make 
no investment of any money held in the Trust 
Estate except as shall be designated in writing 
by the Grantor.11 (R. 26, 27) 
By Warranty Deed (Ex. 5) under date of July 14, 1961, 
the grantor, Dr. Clarence T. Jones, transferred to the First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as trustee, all of the real property 
then held by Dr. Jones (T. 109). 
An example of the total retention of incidents of 
ownership over the real property after the same had been trans-
ferred by the grantor to the trustee, is a Lease Agreement (Ex. 4) 
under date of August 1, 1961, between the trustee and one James M. 
Levie. The agreement provided for a six year lease of one and 
one-half to two acres of real property that had been previously 
transferred to the trustee by the grantor and specifically set 
forth this acknowledgment by the grantor: 
"I, Clarence T. Jones, state that I am the 
beneficial owner of the premises leased 
herein, and the Seller referred to in Para-
graph No. 3 of this agreement, and hereby 
agree to all the terms and provisions hereof 
insofar as they relate to or place any obli-
gation upon me." (Ex. 4, p. 4) 
4. 
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Mr. Cuthbert, as the administrating trust officer, 
conceded that the grantor retained the free power to revoke, 
amend, or modify the trust agreement (T. 110, 111); that the 
grantor could order and direct the trustee to return any and 
all properties by so designating in writing (T. Ill); that any 
disposition of the trust property, either by sale or lease, 
required the trustee to gain the grantor's prior permission 
(T. Ill); that investments of any proceeds or income by the 
trustee required the grantor's prior permission (T. Ill); and, 
that had the grantor elected and demanded the trustee by written 
notice to reassign, convey, transfer or deliver to the grantor 
any or all of the property in the trust estate, the trustee 
would have done so (T. 113). 
Mrs. Thressa G. Jones first became acquainted with 
Dr. Clarence T. Jones at approximately the time the second 
World War ended (T. 14). After Dr. Jones' daughter passed 
away and certain grandchildren went to live with him, Dr. Jones 
asked Mrs. Jones to move into Dr. Jones' residence in American 
Fork, Utah, and assist the Doctor and his wife in taking care 
of the grandchildren (T. 17). Mrs. Jones refused this request 
(T. 17). 
Dr. Jones' prior wife died in June of 1960 (T. 20) 
and Dr. Jones again requested Mrs. Jones to move into his 
residence (T. 21) and represented that if Mrs. Jones did so 
and it was agreeable with Mrs. Jones, the two would get married 
(T. 21). Mrs. Jones did move into the Doctor's residence in 
July of 1960 (T. 23) and assisted the Doctor with the three 
5. 
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grandchildren (T. 21). In addition, Mrs. Jones performed the 
housework, cooking and washing chores and also assisted the 
Doctor in his veterinarian work (T. 22). After moving into 
the residence, Mrs. Jones repeatedly inquired of Dr. Jones 
as to when the marriage would take place. Dr. Jones would 
respond by saying that he had certain business to attend to 
before the marriage. (T. 30). 
In the latter part of November, 1960, Etta Jean Horn, 
the sole child of Thressa G. Jones, accompanied Dr. Jones on 
a shopping trip in Salt Lake City, Utah (T. 57). Dr. Jones 
had asked Mrs. Horn to go with him as he planned to buy Mrs. 
Jones an engagement and wedding ring (T. 58). A full wedding 
ring set was purchased by Dr. Jones (T. 59) and Dr. Jones 
gave Mrs. Jones the engagement ring either for Christmas of 
1960 or for her birthday in January of 1961 (T. 59). Mrs. 
Jones further testified that before her mother went to American 
Fork to Dr. Jones1 residence, her mother assured her that 
Dr. Jones had agreed that the two would be married within a 
reasonable length of time (T. 66). 
Mrs. Erma Uddy Smith testified that in January of 
1961, Mrs. Smith and her husband were at the Jones1 residence 
in American Fork, Utah, and that Mrs. Jones showed her the 
engagement ring (T. 50). Mrs. Smith further testified that 
at approximately 4:00 a.m. on November 11, 1961, she and her 
husband accompanied Mr. and Mrs. Jones to Las Vegas, Nevada, 
where Mr. and Mrs. Jones were married with Mr. and Mrs. Smith 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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acting as witnesses (T. 51). 
By way of summary, Mrs. Jones initially moved into 
the American Fork residence in July, 1960 (T. 23); became en-
gaged to Dr. Jones on Christmas, 1960 or her birthday in 
January, 1961 (T.59); Dr. Jones executed the trust agreement 
June 23, 1961 (R. 26-41), executed the Warranty Deed on July 14, 
1961 (Ex. 5) and the Lease Agreement on the 1st day of August, 
1961 (Ex. 4); and, Dr. Jones and Thressa G. Jones were married 
in Las Vegas, Nevada on the 11th day of November, 1961 (T. 51). 
Mrs. Jones did not have any knowledge of the trust 
prior to the marriage between the parties (T. 24) and even 
after Mrs. Jones became aware of some arrangement between 
Dr. Jones and the First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., it was 
not until after the Doctor's death on the 9th day of August, 
1973, that Mrs. Jones discovered that the Doctor's real pro-
perty holdings had been transferred to the trust (T. 35, 36). 
The administrating trust officer, Mr. Cuthbert, acknowledged 
that he did not meet Mrs. Jones at the bank offices until 1964 
or 1965 (T. 108) and that Mrs. Jones never actively participated 
in any conversations between Mr. Cuthbert and Dr. Jones re-
garding the establishment or management of the subject trust 
(T. 108). 
Clarence T. Jones died on the 9th day of August, 
1973 (R. 5), leaving Mrs. Jones as his surviving spouse. The 
Trust Agreement was in full force and effect during the mar-
riage between the parties and at the time of Dr. Jones' death. 
7. 
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Mrs. Thressa G. Jones died intestate on the 25th 
day of November, 1974, and on the 24th day of February, L975, 
her sole surviving child, Mrs. Etta Jean Horn, was duly 
appointed administratrix of the estate of Thressa G. Jones, 
deceased. Accordingly, Etta Jean Horn as the administratrix 
of the estate of Thressa G. Jones, was substituted as the 
party-plaintiff by order under date of March 31, 1975 (R. 113, 
112) . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY THE PREMARRIAGE CREATION OF A REVOCABLE 
INTER VIVOS TRUST THAT INCLUDED RETENTION 
OF INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY, 
BOTH REAL AND PERSONAL, THAT CONSTITUTE 
THE TRUST CORPUS, THE GRANTOR REMAINED 
POSSESSED DURING THE COURSE OF THE MARRIAGE 
OF A LEGAL OR EQUITABLE ESTATE IN SAID 
REAL PROPERTY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE 
SURVIVING WIDOW WAS VESTED WITH A ONE-
THIRD DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE INTEREST IN AND 
TO SAID REAL PROPERTY. 
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) provides in part: 
"One-third in value of all the legal or 
equitable estates in real property pos-
sessed by the husband at any time during 
the marriage, to which the wife has made 
no relinquishment of her rights, shall be 
set apart as her property in fee simple, 
if she survives him * * * ." (Emphasis 
added) 
The nature of the distributive share interest re-
served to a surviving widow by Section 74-4-3 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) has been described as an inchoate 
8. 
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right that is contingent on the existence of a valid marriage 
between the parties and the survival by the wife of the 
husband. If these two contingencies are satisfied, the in-
terest vests in the wife immediately on the death of the 
husband. As stated in Gee vs. Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 Pac. 
680 (1921), at 58 Utah 452: 
"While it is true that under our statute 
dower by that name is abolished and the 
wife takes one-third of her husbands real 
estate in fee if she survive him, yet, 
unless she does survive him, she has no 
interest in his real estate. The interest 
of the wife, although in fee, is, never-
theless, a mere inchoate interest, and 
depends entirely upon the condition that 
she survive her husband." 
Even though the interest of the wife is inchoate 
and vesting thereof dependent on the occurence of certain 
contingencies, a husband may not extinguish this right by 
contract, Kelsey vs. Crowther 7 Utah 519, 27 Pac. 695 
(1891); further, 
11
 * * * A married man shall not devise 
away from his wife more than two-thirds 
in value of his legal or equitable estates 
in real property without her consent in 
writing.11 (Section 74-1-1 Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953, as amended) 
In Hilton vs. Sloan et al. 37 Utah 359, 108 Pac. 
689 (1910), the court stated at 37 Utah 378: 
"We concede that the law favors the dower right, 
and is tenacious in protecting the wifes right in 
her husbands estate." 
This protection is illustrated by In re Reynolds 
Estate 90 Utah 415, 62 P. 2d 270 (1936), wherein it was 
Q 
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determined that the surviving wife was entitled to one-third 
in value of all real property possessed by the husband during 
the course of the marriage whether the same was mortgaged 
or free of a mortgage lien. The Utah State Tax Commission 
had petitioned the court to have the inheritance tax com-
puted on the basis that the surviving widow's one-third 
interest attached only to the difference between the value 
of the land and the balance of the outstanding mortgage as 
of the date of the husband1s death. The court stated at 
90 Utah 420: 
"When she signs for accommodation purposes, 
she relinquishes that one-third interest 
only in case the mortgagee shall require 
to resort to it for collection. If the 
mortgage overlaps the one-third interest, 
i.e., there is a necessity for resorting 
to more than two-thirds of the proceeds 
of the property, by her joint signing 
she consents to that incursion on such 
one-third of the proceeds.11 
Even by the execution of the mortgage, the sur-
viving wife's one-third interest could be invaded only if 
the value of the remaining two-thirds was insufficient to 
redeem the mortgage. 
An attempt to contract by the husband without 
the concurrence of the wife does not render the contract 
void but the wife's distributive share interest will be 
protected as an encumbrance on the property. As stated 
in McNeill vs. McNeill, et al. 61 Utah 141, 211 Pac. 988 
(1922), at 61 Utah 149: 
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!tIf this was a case in which he (husband) 
held legal title encumbered by an inchoate 
right of dower even then he (husband) 
should be required to convey the interest 
he has in the lands subject to such right 
of dower." 
Once the distributive share interest has vested 
in the surviving wife, she becomes a tenant in common as 
to the real property subject only to a proper renunciation 
of the husband's will pursuant to Section 74-4-4 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended). As stated in Free vs. Little, 
et al. 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407 (1907), 31 Utah 456: 
"When the writing in question was executed, 
as well as when this action was commenced 
and the decree entered, Section 2826 giving 
the wife one-third of the husband's interest 
in real estate, whether legal or equitable, 
possessed by him during the marriage, was 
in full force and effect. This one-third 
interest she holds as an inchoate right 
during the life of the husband, and upon 
his death it passes to her in fee simple. 
* * * Alice S. Little, the wife, therefore, 
claiming under the statutes, and no speci-
fic devise having been made of this real 
estate she and her children, immediately 
upon the death of the husband and father, 
under the statutes of this state became 
vested with the legal title as tenants 
in common; the children as heirs holding 
the title subject only to the claim of the 
creditors of the father, while the wife, 
in view of Section 2826, took her interest 
in fee simple discharged from all such 
claims. The husband could not effect the 
rights of the wife either by an agreement 
to sell, or by a conveyance made by him 
alone. The wife and the children, in legal 
effect, thus were and remained tenants in 
common, she holding a one-third undivided 
interest and the children the undivided 
remainder until such time as the court 
made distribution * * * ." (Emphasis 
added) 
11. 
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The preliminary consideration in this proceeding 
is whether a trust that reserves to the grantor the right 
to direct the payment of income and principle to the grantor 
during his lifetime, to amend or revoke the trust in whole 
or in part, to free the trust corpus from the terms of 
the trust, withdraw all or any part of the trust corpus, 
designate in writing the investment, sale or other dis-
position of any of the trust corpus and otherwise resides 
in the grantor complete dominion and control over the trust 
res, is a legal or equitable estate in the real property 
comprising a portion of the trust corpus. If so, the 
lower court must be reversed because these incidents of 
ownership were possessed by the grantor during the marriage 
to Mrs. Jones and until his death in August of 1973. In 
Sayre vs. Mohney et al. 30 Or. 238, 47 Pac. 197 (1896), 
the court stated at 47 Pac. 198: 
"Formerly * * * every estate was legal, 
in the proper acception of that term: 
and in the contemplation of law, there 
is and can be, but one estate, which 
may properly be denominated !legal 
estate.1 But the introduction of what 
were known as 'uses,1 and the subsequent 
origination of trusts, where one party 
held the title, but upon some trust or 
confidence for another, early led the 
courts of chancery to take cognizant 
of the rights of the beneficiary; and 
thus there grew up a double ownership 
of lands thus situated, the interests 
which were cognizable as such only in 
court of equity taking the name of 
'equitable1 to distinguish them from 
1
 legal estates.' " 
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That portion of Section 74-4-3 Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953, as amended) hereinunder consideration, was 
originally taken from the state of Iowa (In re Reynolds 
Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 Pac. 2d 270 (1936) and it is a 
familiar rule of statutory construction that the judicial 
interpretation of the original statute by the state of Iowa 
should be persuasively considered. 73 Am Jur 2d Statutes, 
Section 335. In Curtis et al. vs. Reilly et al., 188 Iowa 
1217, 177 N.W. 535 (1920), the court stated at 177 N.W. 538: 
"An 'equitable estate1 or interest in 
land is, generally speaking, some definite 
right or interest in the property such as 
will furnish ground for equitable relief 
against a trustee or against any person 
or persons asserting a hostile right or 
interest therein.11 (Emphasis added) 
By the clear and unambiguous wording of the subject Trust 
Agreement, the grantor was entitled the income therefrom, alter, 
amend or revoke the trust, withdraw any or all of the trust corpus 
from the operation of the trust and the sale, and investment 
or other disposition of any of the trust property was subject 
to the written designation and direction of the grantor. 
The fact that the only power exercised by the grantor was 
the receipt of income from the trust is immaterial. As 
stated by this Court in Leach vs. Anderson, Utah 2d 
, 535 P. 2d 1241 (1975) at 535 P. 2d at 1243: 
"Whether the trust should be regarded as one 
created for the use and benefit of the trustor, 
is to be determined upon what she has a right 
to take under its terms during her lifetime, 
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rather than upon what she has actually used 
therefrom." (Emphasis added) 
Had the trustee refused to reassign, convey, tranfer or 
deliver any property to the grantor after written notice of the 
grantors election, the trustee would have been in overt violation 
of the expressed terms and conditions of the Trust Agreement and 
appropriate legal proceedings would have been available to the 
grantor to compel such action by the trustee. The grantor did 
retain such a right and interest in the subject real property that 
equitable relief would have been available to the grantor had the 
trustee not abided by the grantor's direction. Such a protecta-
bel interest is clearly within the definition of !llegal or 
equitable estate" within the context of Section 74-4-3 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
The second consideration thus becomes the definition 
of the word "possessed11 as the same is used in the subject 
statute. 
The word "possessed11 does not refer to physical 
possession of the real property but, rather, refers to pos-
session of the legal or equitable estate. In 0TConner vs. 
Halpin, 166 Iowa 101, 147 N.W. 185 (1914), the court considered 
Section 3366 of the Iowa Code which provides: 
"One-third in value of the legal or equitable 
estate in real property possessed by the hus-
band at any time during the marriage, which 
have not been sold on the execution or other 
judicial sale, and to which the wife had made 
no relinquishment of her right, shall be set 
apart as her property in fee simple, if she 
survives him." 
14. 
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The court determined that a daughter who had sur-
vived the testator father but predeceased her mother, was 
vested with the remainder of the father's estate subject only 
to the mother's life estate therein even though the daughter 
was not entitled to physical possession or right of immediate 
enjoyment of the real property. 
The court stated at 147 N.W. 187: 
"The word 'possessed,1 as used in Section 
3366, relates to the estate in the property, 
and not the property itself.11 
In Clarken vs. Brown, 258 Iowa 18, 137 N.W. 2d 376 
(1965) the testator devised a life estate with the remainder 
to his statutory heirs. The question was when the remainder 
interest vested because two brothers had predeceased the life 
estate and their surviving spouses claimed a distributive share 
in each deceased brother's interest. The court determined 
that the deceased husbands were "possessed" of the remainder, 
thus entitling their surviving widows to assert their distri-
butive share interest. See also Hanke vs. Bjorgo, 152 N.W. 
2d 262 (Iowa, 1967). 
As previously noted, the grantor in this proceeding 
retained a legally and equitably protectable interest in and to 
the real property that constituted a portion of the trust 
corpus. This retention constituted possession of a protect-
able legal and equitable estate. 
The establishment of the trust prior to the marriage 
of the parties did not defeat appellant's distributive share Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
interest in the real property that formed a portion of the 
trust corpus because after the execution of the Trust Agree-
ment the grantor possessed a legally and equitably protectable 
estate and this possession continued throughout the course 
of the marriage until the instant of the grantor's death. 
The grantor never divested himself of this legal and equit-
able estate and appellant's distributive share interest in 
and to the real property vested on the grantor's death. 
POINT II 
THE CREATION OF A REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST ON 
THE EVE OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE GRANTOR AND 
THRESSA G. JONES CONSTITUTED A FRAUD ON THE 
SURVIVING SPOUSE'S MARITAL RIGHTS. 
The element of fraud required to set aside a conveyance 
as a fraud on the marital rights of a surviving spouse is not the 
same as that normally present in situations involving fraudulent 
misrepresentation. In Wilson vs. Wilson, 32 Utah 169, 89 Pac. 
443 (1907), the court stated at 32 Utah 178: 
"The general rule, undoubtedly, is that a 
voluntary conveyance by either party to a 
marriage contract of his or her real property 
made without the knowledge of the other, and 
on the eve of the marriage, is a fraud upon 
the marital rights of such other, and that 
such a conveyance will be treated as fraud-
ulent and void as against the party surprised, 
and his or her marital rights in the land so 
conveyed will not be effected thereby. 
(Daniher v. Daniher, 201 111. 489, 63 N.E. 
239, and cases there cited.) It is also 
there stated that some courts have held 
that the purpose to deceive and defraud the 
other prospective spouse is imputed to the 
one who makes the attempted transfer and 
conceals the fact till after the marriage, 
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and that it makes no difference in principal 
whether actual fraud was intended or not, in 
support of which is cited Ward v. Ward, 
63 Ohio St. 125, 57 N.E. 1095, 51 L.R.A. 
858, 81 Am. St. Rep. 621, and Arnegaard v. 
Arnegaard, 7 N.D. 475, 75 N.W. 797, 41 
L.R.A. 258. But it is also there stated 
that the better rule is, where any such 
voluntary conveyance is made without the 
knowledge of the other of such contracting 
parties, it presents a prima facie case of 
fraud subject to be explained by the parties 
interested, and the burden is on the grantee 
to establish the validity of the deed, in 
support of which is cited Fennessey v. 
Fennessey, 84 Ky. 519, 2 S.W. 158, 4 Am. St. 
Rep. 210; Hamilton v. Smith, 57 Iowa, 15 
10 N.W. 276, 42 Am. Rep. 39; Champlin v. 
Champlin, 16 R. I. 314, 15 Atl. 85." 
The evidence is conclusive that the grantor, Dr. 
Clarence T. Jones, purchased an engagement and wedding ring 
set while accompanied by Mrs. Jones's daughter in late 
November, 1960. The engagement ring was given to Mrs. Jones 
either during the holidays of 1960 or her birthday on January 
2, 1961. Prior to their marriage, the grantor had told Mrs. 
Jones that he had a large farm and chicken ranch (T. 15); 
that he had certain business to attend to before the marriage 
(T. 30); and, that the creation of the trust and subsequent 
transfer of real property thereto was accomplished by Dr. 
Jones in contemplation of his forthcoming marriage to 
Thressa G. Jones. 
The evidence is clear and convincing that the 
primary motivation for the establishment of the trust was to avoid 
the statutory rights of the grantor's anticipated bride while 
preserving in the grantor all of the incidents of ownership 
17. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
enjoyed by Dr. Jones prior to the creation of the subject trust. 
POINT III 
THE TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY TO THE SUBJECT 
TRUST WAS ILLUSORY AND DID NOT OPERATE TO DE-
PRIVE THRESSA G. JONES OF HER SUBSEQUENTLY 
VESTED DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE INTEREST. 
A proper conveyance of a present interest in real 
property may not be conditioned or subject to retention by 
the grantor of a subsequent power of disposition during his 
lifetime. Where, as here, the grantor retains the absolute 
power to make a disposition of the real property inconsistent 
with the terms of the trust, it cannot be said that the 
grantor in fact transferred anything. In discussing the 
validity of a deed that did not convey a present interest 
because it did not become certain and effective until the 
death of the grantor terminated his right of recall, the 
court in Thuet vs. Thuet, 128 Colo. 54, 260 P. 2d 604, 
stated at 260 P. 2d 606: 
MIn such case, the delivery would be a 
mere pretense by which in fact the grantor 
retained the ownership and power of disposi-
tion of the property during his lifetime 
and sought by means of the deed to give 
the property to the grantee only upon his 
death. Hence such purported conveyance 
would be colorable only and the transfer 
not real, but illusory.M 
This same rationale has been applied in instances in-
volving revocable inter vivos trusts whether created before or 
after a marriage. In Ackers vs. First National Bank of Topeka, 
192 Kan. 319, 387 P. 2d 840, the court concluded at 387 P. 2d 851: 
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11
 * * * [t]hat the husband of a nonresident 
wife may, by absolute sale, gift or other 
transfer made in good faith during his life-
time, deprive the wife of her distributive 
share. However, if the transfer is colorable 
only and the husband retains the power of 
revocation, it is felacious, elusive, and 
deceiving, and will be considered as fraud 
/ on the rights of the widow where she is 
deprived of her distributive share.11 
In Smith vs. Northern Trust Company, 322 111. App. 168, 
54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944), the court held that the transfer to a trust, 
although absolute in form, was illusory and void as to the rights 
of the surviving widow. The court cited Newman vs. Pore, 275 N.Y. 
371, 9 N.E. 2d 966, 122 A.L.R. 643, wherein it was stated: 
11 !
 * * * [grantor] reserved the enjoyment of the 
entire income as long as he should live, and 
a right to revoke the trust at his will, and 
in general the powers granted to the trustees 
were in terms made 'subject to the settlor's 
control during his life,1 and could be exer-
cised 'in such manner only as the settlor shall 
from time to time direct in writing.' Thus, by 
the trust agreement which transferred to the 
trustee the settlor's entire property, the 
settlor reserved substantially the same rights 
to enjoy and control the disposition of the 
property as he previously had possessed, and 
the inference is inescapable that the trust 
agreements were executed by the settlor, as the 
court has found, 'with the intention and for the 
purpose of diminishing his estate and thereby 
to reduce in amount the share' of his wife in 
his estate upon his death and as a 'contrivance 
to depirve * * * his widow of any right in and 
to his property upon his death.' fl 
The court further observed at 54 N.E. 2d 78: 
"The test has been formulated in different 
ways, but in most jurisdictions the test 
applied is essentially the test of whether 
the husband has in good faith divested him-
self of ownership of his property, or has 
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made an illusory transfer. In no juris-
diction has a transfer in trust been upheld 
where the conveyance is intended only to 
cover up the fact that the husband is re-
taining full control of the property though 
in form he has parted with it. (Emphasis 
added) 
• • • The court furthci * di sc nxssi i I < ini 1 c • I ted w 1 th appi o va] the 
case of Martin v s . Martin, 282 Ky. 'ill, KS8 S.W. 2d 509 as 
follows: 
11
 * -k * [tjhe surviving wife sought to reach 
the unexpended part of approximately $30,000 
deposited in several banks to the credit of 
her deceased husband and by him transferred 
to his sister several weeks before his marriage 
with plaintiff; it appeared that the sister 
expended no part of the money for her own 
uses, but gave to her brother in his lifetime 
such sums as he requested. The transfer was 
held invalid as to the wife, and the court 
said (419, 420 of 282 Ky., 514 of 138 S.W. 2d): 
!It must be conceded that the decided weight 
of authority is that an absolute bonafide 
gift of personalty by a man contemplating 
marriage with a woman, or even by a husband 
during his life, is not a fraud on the marital 
rights of the wife, or intended wife, even 
though made with the intention and purpose of 
depriving her of the right of sharing in 
such property. [Citing cases.] This rule 
is generally stated with the qualification 
that if a transfer by a husband be colorable 
merely, that is, a mere device by which the 
husband does not part with absolute dominion 
over the property, it will be considered a 
fraud on the wife s marital rights, and it 
is also generally held that a gift causa 
mortis by a husband to a third person is a 
fraud on the wife's marital rights, where 
the gift is made to prevent her sharing 
in the property, since the gift does not 
take effect until the death of the donor1." 
(54 N.E. 2d at 78) (Emphasis added.) 
The court concluded at 54 N.E. 2d 78: 
MHere the trust estate constituted all 
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he reserved for himself all of the income 
from the trust and the right, in event of 
illness or changed business conditions, 
to request of the trustee enough of the 
principal of the trust estate to maintain 
him in the manner in which he was accustomed 
to live; under the terms of the agreement 
by which the settlor reserved the right to 
revoke, alter or amend the trust agreement, 
any request by the settlor for any part of 
the principal would be equivalent to a 
command, which the trustee could not 
disobey except at the risk of having the 
trust terminated; the trust agreement 
expressly reserved to the settlor a veto 
over the sale, disposition or investment 
of trust assets by the trustee, and the 
right to revoke, alter or amend the trust 
agreement gave the settlor power to direct 
and control any change in the securities 
or any investment of trust funds; hence, 
as in the case as heretofore discussed, 
the transfer of title to the trustee, 
although absolute in form, was merely 
colorable and illusory. It was therefore 
invalid as to plaintiff, who is entitled 
to a widow s award and to one-third of the 
estate of her deceased husband . » , .fl 
(Emphasis addedT) "" 
In Land vs. Marshall, -;.••• ^ a r.'\ . t ne court 
adopted the proposition that, f! * * * [t]he failure of an 
illusory trust need no I rust upon proof of an intent to defraud 
the wife.n (426 S..W, 2d at 848) The court further stated the 
true test as: 
"Did the decedent, by the conveyance in his 
lifetime, retain such a large interest in the 
property that, at least as to his wife, his 
inter vivos trust: was illnsorv?" (428 S.W. 
2d at 848) 
Tn Comments Edward •. .i-.iiii/i, 44 Mich. I. p — "* r1 i 
is stated at page 152: 
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MThe courts have been very watchful, however, 
to see that such transfers are made in 
good faith. The doctrine of 'fraud on the 
marital right1 developed early. The rule 
is usually stated that if a man conveys 
his real property on the eve of marriage 
with the intent of depriving his wife of 
dower therein, she is entitled to dower as if 
the deed had not been made,f! 
The Comment further distinguished between trusts that 
are avoided on the ground that they are illusory as seated in 
Newman vs. Pore, supra, arid those avoi ded 01, ^i *!.d : ;•. . -1 g 
an improper intent \o the effect that they are "-TO Lorable.,f The 
distinction between the i.,-r ;;a; idmittedlv "^rbitrar^" with the 
term "colorable' -\di .:ai;i.n^ ? ;' • , <• . transfer wind.":, may be 
absolute on its face, :m which, actually, • .- .^-: i* transfer at 
a] 1 because, t ;v .i.., - -;^;,\ ••*. •, i .- h . •/ a. . : •. -V -* -i-.\ ' - .u(, the 
parties intended that ownership ih ! •.. t>.. retained by * he donor.11 
(At page 153) 
In discussing Newman vs. Pore, supra, it i s stated: 
"The court specifically rejected all. theories 
of intent and fraud, and held that the only 
sound test was whether the husband had in 
good faith divested himself of ownership of 
his property or had made an i1 lusory transfer. 
-k * * 
"Evidently the court did not meati 'colorable1 
when it used the term 'illusory.1 Nor did it 
mean to include any element of bad motive 
or intent to defraud the wife; though it 
would seem that it was unfortunate to include 
the phrase fin good faith1 in its explanation 
of the term. The test which the court was 
laying down, at least if we are to interpret 
it in the light of subsequent New York's 
decisions was this: Pid the decedent, by 
the conveyance in his lifetime, retain such 
a large interest in the property that, at 
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transfer was illusory1 Or to use the phrase 
of Mr. Justice Holmes, quoted by the court 
from Leonard vs. Leonard, can we say that 
Tfrom the technical point of view such a 
conveyance does not take back all that it 
gives, but practically it does?1" (At 
pages 154, 155) (Emphasis added,) 
The Comment concludes: 
"To draw some conclusions from our study it 
would seem first, that substantially all of 
the recent case cite Newman v. Door and at 
least consider the doctrine it sets forth. 
A great majority of these follow 1t in 
general principle; some give it a modified 
application. (At page 159) 
"What have we then which we can call a 
basic principle that will give coordination 
to our thinking and lend a degree of 
harmony to the decisions? Only the bare 
fundamental principle of Newman v. Dore that 
the test is whether the settlor intended to 
divest himself of his property or whether 
he intended only to cover up the fact that 
he was retaining full control, (Emphasis 
added) 
"You may feel that this conclusion merely 
brings us back to our starting point; but 
we must keep in mind that the intent by 
which we test the transfers is not the 'intent 
to defraud1 of the earlier decisions, but 
an intent to retain, or part with, the 
ownership of the property in question, If 
arriving at the end of our discussion 
with the rule of intent seems somewhat 
dissappointing, we must remember that we 
have not only rule of intent, but a rule of 
intent with guideposts " (At page ] 62) 
The totality of ilie evidence overwhelmingly estab-. 
lishes thai f lie * j^ ranLor. ; . ' larence T. Jones, created a 
trust and transferred real property thereto but nothing really 
happened. By any sicii.driu . ..•;., \i-;/y, the tr list was 
illusory to the extent that it attempted i:o deprive Thressa G. 
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Jones oi" h e r m a r i t a l r ip j i l > Th i s t ln r .<d" by I ho H,raulwr 
should not- be s a n c t i o n e d or condoned by ! h l s C o u r t . 
POINT IV 
A REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST RETAINING ALL 
INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP IN THE GRANTOR MAY NOT 
DEFEAT THE DESIGNED STATUTORY POLICY ESTABLISHED 
TO PR OTECT A SUR VIVING SPOUSE. 
Section 74-1-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amend'H: , 'pro \/l cles in part: 
" .* * * [t]hat a married man shall not devise 
away from his wife more than two-thirds in 
value of his legal or equitable estates in 
real property without her consent in writing.11 
The intestate succession statute prov 1 cles I i I par t: 
11
 If the decedent leaves a surviving husband 
or wife, and only one child or the issue of 
one child, in equal shares to the surviving 
husband or wife, and child or issue of such 
child; if the decedent leaves a surviving 
husband or wife, and more than one child 
living or one child living and the issue 
of one or more deceased children, one-
third to the surviving husband or wife, 
and a remainder in equal shares to his 
children and to the issue of any deceased 
child by right of representation; but 
if there is no child of the decedent living 
at his death, the remainder goes to all 
of his lineal descendants; and if all the 
decedents are in the same degree of kindred 
to the decedent, they share equally, other-
wise they take by right of representation. 
The share in the legal and equitable es-
tates in real property of which an intestate 
husband dies possessed, secured by this 
section to his widow, shall not be addi-
tional to the interest to such estate 
provided for her in Section 74-3-3~~ (74-
4-5, Utah Code Annotated, (1953, as amended) 
(Emphasis added.) 
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The clear purpose of the statutory scheme above 
noted is to provide for a surviving 'widow bv pi oh i bit ing <i 
married vum ( ro . i ing away from his wile more than two- •' 
thirds of his estate* in real property and protecting the 
widow in the event • < husband dies intk.',-.i;t i"; ^  question 
tlins becomes whether a husband through the guise of .. revo-
cable inter vivos trust that retains all incidents ui 
ownership created prior to hul in contemplation and on the 
eve oi ' he marriage, may accomplish what he would otherwise 
be statutorily prohibited'from al;tempting. 
In Montgomery v. Michaels, V> Mi. ?d c>32, 301 N.E 
2d 465 (lM/3), a surviving husband was allowed to :; laion a 
one-third disM iuo ••/>-• :a - - - s;e- : a'O savings account 
trust (Totten Trusts) created by aLs deceased wife. The court 
recognized 301 N.E. 2d 466: 
"In Petralia (In re Estate of Petralia, 32 
111. 2d 134, 204 N.E. 2d 1 (1965)) we held 
that if the settlor is also the trustee 
and retains complete control over the 
account during his or her lifetime, such 
a savings account is not different in sub-
stance from other revocable inter vivos 
trusts, which this court has found to be 
valid . . . ." 
. The court lurtht; stated the issue to be: 
11
 * * -k [w]hether such a trust is valid for 
every purpose, and particularly whether it 
is effective to defeat a surviving spouse's 
statutory share in the estate of his deceased 
spouse, and his right to a widower's award ff 
(301 N.E. 2d 466) 
The court then discussed the expressed ;n:I.^ i-f 
The Probate Act in protecting the expectancy whio-1 A Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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viving spouse may anticipate from the others estate. It was 
recognized that, "[sjwiuc: . i-.c suggest that the answer should 
depei.'i ;:,- *. * he intent oi * ,,, ieceased spouse in creating 
the trust " ('JO! N I- n - - However, it was further 
re.Mvrii-;•. • * nn; : ,e ',» : i : * ;. s and i nfl rmi ti es in dele rmi n i ag 
the intent oi a decedent were readily apparent. It was then 
recognized that the settlor, during her lifetime: 
11
 * * * [r]etained absolute, unqualified 
control over the bank accounts, and pos-
sessed and exercised all incidents of 
complete ownership, including the right 
to receive interest payable thereon and 
withdraw the principal thereof." (301 
N.E. 2d 467) 
The court concluded at 30J. N.E„ 2d 467: 
"Under these circumstances, the expressed 
statutory policy of protecting a surviving 
spouses1 statutory share i ii the estate 
should prevail, regardless of the intent of 
the deceased spouse in creating the savings-
account trust.fI 
In I A Scott, Law of Trusts , Supplement, Sectioi i 57 5 
; JJ e<L i.''0 7) it is stated at pages 36, .< ;; 
"The statutes enacted in most of the states 
giving a forced share of the estate of the 
deceased spouse to the surviving spouse 
are quite recent. In New York, for example, 
the statutes so providing was annexed In 1929, 
The courts generally have taken a strict view 
of the statutes, applying them only to 
dispositions made by the will of the deceased 
spouse. They were generally worded as allowing 
the surviving spouse an election to take 
against the will of the deceased spouse. 
But it seems clear that the deceased spouse 
should not be permitted to evade the policy 
underlying the statutes by making dispositions 
inter vivos in which he retained the advantages 
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of ownership up to the time of his death, as 
in the case of a revocable trust. Such a 
disposition is not, as we have seen, invalid 
as a testamentary disposition not complying 
the requirements of the Statute of Wills. 
But it is sufficiently like a testamentary 
disposition so that it should be subject to 
the rights of the surviving spouse.1 
(Emphasis added.) 
Whether considered as an element in determining the 
intent of the grantor or independently to render a IT-IS? 
1 1 3 u s o ry , 11 ie ma i n tihre a d ty ing a. 1 ] < :> f 11 Ie d e < ; . • . * * *. • > T i.- xer 
T r:he consideration of the nature and extent of the ;jower, 
control arid dominion over the trust corpus retained by Lhe 
grantor W here the retention of control i s as complete as 
in this Trust Agreement, iI: matters "1 ittle whether i: e termed 
evi d en c e o f t h e g r an t o r ' s f r audu 1 en t I i I t e i I t:, s u f f T T 
and of itsel f to render the trust illusory or contrary \o he 
policy underlying the statutory scheme of providing for and 
prot:ecti ng the int:erest of a sur v 1 ving spouse.-
An analogous situation was recently considered by 
this Court in Leach vs. Anderson, supra, wherei n a spend-
•r.ii.'- trust was invalidated as against * i adgment creditor. 
This Court recognized that Section z>-i-i: Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953, as amended) j n recli ided -< T ">-.;.,CG in tin ist for 
the use of the trustor as against existing or subsequent 
creditors and. stated at 535 P. 2d at 1243: 
"That a trustor can deal generally with 
his property as he desires we have no 
doubt; and this includes placing it in 
an irrevocable trust, beyond his own 
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power to reclaim, or to sell or alienate 
it; and may include a so-called 'spend-
thrift trust1 provision to safeguard 
against improvident dissipation thereof. 
But as the trust may affect third parties, 
the situation is different. The intent 
and the effect of the statute is to pre-
vent a person from using a trust as a 
devise by which he can retain for himself 
and enjoy substantially all of the advan-
tages of ownership and at the same time 
place it beyond the legitimate claims of 
his creditors. (Emphasis added.) 
Altho;i • : .. .r r i '.,.•!• \» r^ •. * ^ =;> u : - '. : iS;udLe, 
the same does vesi :_n favor .-i the s ii vivin^ spouse I-M the 
•u-.jf.h 01 the husband and the same policy that protects sub-
sequent creditors from a debtor i nsiilati ng hi s assets while 
enjoying the benefits thereof should also protect a surviving 
s p i) u s e II ie e n d i : e s i :i 11: s hou 1 ci b e t:he s arne , to - wi t: that the 
transfer of real property to a revocable inter vivos trust 
wherein all of the incidents of ownership are retained by 
the grantor will not: operate to defeat the statutorily 
protected distributive share interest of the surviving 
spouse, 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the Findings 
of Fact: and Conc 1 usIons of Law, : ;• :1 " ] • *"":;A: \vcioP.L of the 1 ower 
court are clearly erroneous and •••;•. support ed hv the record 
herein Accordingly, appellant is entitled tr a reversal 
thereof with a direction from th^ ••,. . • i il^i\r: t, 
entered in favor of appellant awarding appellant a fee simple 
interest in one-third in value of" all real property lv-i.. ' v 
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the trustee at any time from the creai ',, , : • • 
the death of the trustor. 
y 
DATED this <#? day of August, .975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS, 
LEONARD & TATE 
'* t^ 
J0^ / ^ ^ 
By y/&tj/<T- fo^azsO^ 
Gary/A. Frank 
VSS* 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1515 Walker Bank Building 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841H 
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